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BEYOND ECONOMICS AS RELIGION
Peter J. Hil t
Robert Nelson has written an illuminating and carefully reasoned
argument about the implicit normative assumptions of modem eco-
nomics. He is surely correct that the discipline makes important as-
sumptions about values in most of its analysis. Nelson calls these
norms religion, and, to the extent that one considers all normative
statements religious in nature, he is accurate.' He is also accurate in
his claim that the religious aspects of economics, particularly its faith
in the "secular religion of economic progress," have proven inade-
quate to satisfy the deeper longings of the human heart for meaning
and purpose in life.2
But where do these views leave the modem social scientist? Is
economics nothing more than sophisticated hand waving to justify
certain normative assumptions? Or should it acknowledge its reli-
gious character and proceed forthwith? Unfortunately, Nelson is not
clear whether it is desirable for economics to have religious content or
not. Sometimes he seems to be arguing that economists should be
more careful to separate their value assumptions from their positive
analysis, while at other times, he seems to think no such separation is
possible. And he closes his book with two somewhat contradictory
themes: (1) a luke-warm endorsement of recent work in economics
that explicitly acknowledges the normative content of its analysis and
(2) a call for the discipline to accept the fact that its secular plan of
salvation has failed. 3
I believe that one can recast and modify Nelson's arguments in a
way that not only reclaims much of the value of modem economic
analysis but also explicitly acknowledges important ethical and
normative considerations. Three tasks should concern economists as
t George F. Bennett Professor of Economics, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL and Senior
Fellow, Property and Environment Research Center (PERC), Bozeman, MT. He thanks John
Lunn and Tom Lundin for their helpful comments on this paper.
I Most religions of the world deal with issues of worship, transcendence, and questions of
eternity. Nelson could have called his book "ECONOMICS AS NORMS," perhaps a more accurate
but less interesting title.
2 ROBERT H. NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND
BEYOND xv, 301-36 (2001).
3 Id. at 229, 336.
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they deal honestly with both the normative and positive aspects of
their discipline. First, they should acknowledge that there are
normative aspects of their work, and that such assumptions are
important to resolving what Nelson finds to be paradoxes in
economics. Second, economists should differentiate between personal
relationships and impersonal exchange and should use the tools of
their discipline to explain the workings of impersonal exchange.
Third, economists should recognize the limits of their analysis,
especially in the realm of human flourishing, and they should also
recognize the interrelationship of the different realms (personal and
impersonal) of human action.
I. ECONOMICS AS A POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE SCIENCE
Economics is, at its most basic level, an explanation of the econo-
mizing and exchange process.4 Since it postulates and tests refutable
hypotheses with respect to these processes, it has strong positive ele-
ments. As Nelson points out, however, there are still normative judg-
ments at several points in the analysis.
Economizing focuses on comparing costs and benefits. Exchange
is the transfer of rights. But when one makes any arguments about
costs and benefits, there is either an explicit or implicit judgment
about costs and benefits to whom; in other words, who counts? Like-
wise, one cannot analyze exchange without a specification of the
rights that are being transferred. This means that the analyst needs to
specify the institutional framework underlying economic action, in
particular, the rights framework that is operative. This is a task
economists have often not done well.5
This acknowledgement of the existing set of rights (and of norms,
since rights are ultimately based on norms) solves two problems that
concern Nelson. The first is what he calls the "market paradox ' 6 or
the problem of deciding where self-interest can appropriately operate
and where it cannot. The structure of property rights determines the
legitimate and illegitimate operation of self-interest. The standard
economics paradigm assumes that it is legitimate for a producer to
harm her competitor by making and selling a cheaper product, but
does not allow her to firebomb the physical facilities of her competi-
4 PAUL HEYNE, PETER J. BOET/'KE & DAVID L. PRYCHITKO, THE ECONOMIC WAY OF
THINKING xiii (10th ed. 2003).
1 Douglass North has argued that neoclassical economics "contained two erroneous as-
sumptions: (i) that institutions do not matter and (ii) that time does not matter." Douglass North,
Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 359 (1994).
6 NELSON, supra note 2, at 6.
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tor.7 We recognize that the second producer has a defensible property
right in her physical facilities but not in her market share.
Specification of the rights structure also solves the second problem
of why the psychic costs of change are not included in most economic
calculations. For instance, according to Nelson:
When several smaller farms are consolidated into one larger
and more productive farm, thus helping in fact to improve the
overall efficiency of U.S. agriculture, economists do not
consider the bruised feelings of the smaller farmers
themselves, or the possible distress at their plight that might
be felt by neighbors when the smaller farmers are forced out
of business. 8
Nelson suggests that the reason for omitting the psychic cost of
such pain is the difficulty of measuring it. It is, however, more
straightforward to recognize that people do not have a property right
in the knowledge that small farms exist, and hence the loss of small
farms, while perhaps imposing a real cost on certain members of the
community, is not something that should be recognized in calcula-
tions of efficiency. If one were to include these costs in efficiency
calculations, the entire rights framework would have to be reworked.
Attempting to grant property rights in the existence of particular at-
tributes of an economy (the presence of small farms, the friendliness
of small towns, and the excitement of cities) would be fraught with
enormous problems of definition and enforcement. Hence, granting
rights to physical property and measuring a violation of those rights
through evidence of physical invasion constitutes an eminently defen-
sible rights framework. 9
II. THE ETHICS OF DIFFERENT REALMS OF ACTION
A. Differentiating Between the Personal and the Impersonal
It is useful to recognize that ethical judgments pervade economic
analysis. It is, however, also important to develop a more nuanced
7 The former can be justified and the latter condemned because of the total impact on so-
ciety; in the first case, societal welfare is increased and in the second it is decreased. But even
that analysis requires a normative judgment about who counts and who does not in determining
overall welfare.
8 NELSON, supra note 2, at 66.
9 Rights to physical property are the starting point of our rights framework, but not the
sum total of it. One can also have a property right in an idea (a patent) or in one's reputation,
hence the existence of libel laws. Nevertheless, physical property and physical invasion serve as
useful starting points for rights.
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understanding of the differences in the ethical requirements of differ-
ent types of human interaction. In the words of F.A. Hayek:
Part of our present difficulty is that we must constantly adjust
our lives, our thoughts and our emotions, in order to live si-
multaneously within different kinds of orders according to
different rules. If we were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed,
rules of the micro-cosmos (i.e., of the small band or troop, or
of, say, our families) to the macro-cosmos (our wider civilisa-
tion), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make
us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were always to
apply the rules of the extended order to our more intimate
groupings, we would crush them. So we must learn to live in
two sorts of worlds at once. To apply the name of 'society' to
both, or even to either, is hardly of any use, and can be most
misleading.'0
I shall call the two orders Hayek is describing (1) the world of per-
sonal relationships and personal exchange (his micro-cosmos) and (2)
the world of impersonal exchange (his macro-cosmos). Economists
specialize in explaining the world of impersonal exchange," and their
efforts are important because, as put by Vernon Smith:
[T]here is a world of difference in people's perceptions of the
two forms of exchange. Everybody, except the sociopath, un-
derstands the former and can see that good comes from in-
tending good in personal exchange. The overwhelming ma-
jority of people, however, do not understand markets, and the
good that flows to others by working, performing and produc-
ing for yourself and family.1 2
10 F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT 18 (1988).
11 Economists have also extended their analysis to personal relationships. See GARY S.
BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991). Such work is controversial and for purposes of
this Essay, I will be concentrating on impersonal exchanges. The work on personal relationships
has yielded some important insights, but two significant problems plague much of the research.
Because of the difficulty of measuring many non-monetary aspects of personal relationships, the
empirical work tends to collapse into measures of material well-being. While material well-
being is of importance, many aspects of personal relationships are strongly driven by non-
material considerations. Therefore, explanations tend to be only of secondary considerations in
human action. For instance, one can explain changes in church attendance by changes in
weather (and hence in costs), but it is more difficult to explain why people attend church at all
through measures of material welfare. Additionally, when researchers have attempted to expand
the explanations for human action beyond material measures, their explanations come close to
being tautological; that is, people act in certain ways because we know they are utility maximiz-
ers, even though many arguments in the utility function are unquantifiable.
12 Vernon Smith, Address to the Commonwealth North Forum (Oct. 21, 2003) (transcript
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Thus, economists should take seriously the task of explaining both
the ethics and the coordination process of this world of impersonal
exchange. There are numerous insights to be gained from doing so.
Several are listed below:
1. Perhaps most importantly, good intentions are not necessary for
the functioning of the world of markets. This does not mean that peo-
ple are necessarily selfish, but rather that they pursue ends that they
define to be important. In such a world, person A can be advantaged
by the actions of persons B and C through the process of production
and exchange even if B and C do not necessarily intend A's well-
being. This is in sharp contrast to a well-functioning world of per-
sonal relationships, which requires significant attention to intentions,
strong agreement upon ends, a great deal of information about the
moral character of the participants in social relations, and heavy em-
phasis upon the virtues of compassion and mercy. The world of im-
personal exchange can operate with far fewer ethical requirements,
although honesty, willingness to obey the generally accepted rules of
behavior, and a willingness to keep promises, are important for the
successful functioning of such a world.' 3 In other words, "[m]arkets
economize on the need for virtue, but do not eliminate it."
1 4
2. Prices are an important part of the world of impersonal ex-
change and allow information to be communicated across time and
space.' s Again, there is a normative framework behind the price
mechanism, because prices are simply options to transfer property
rights, and the property rights framework is based upon certain nor-
mative claims. But the effort to understand how information is trans-
ferred by prices is largely a positive science.
3. Competition is a valuable force in a world of impersonal ex-
change. Again, this is when competitive forces are constrained by an
appropriate property rights framework. Otherwise, competition is de-
structive of both wealth and the social order. But in a world of con-
tract enforcement and secure property rights, competition is necessary
in order to generate information about better ways of organizing the
world and low cost means of production and exchange. Competition
also provides rewards to those who find cheaper ways of accomplish-
ing a task. In contrast, competition has less social utility in the world
of personal exchange, since information about options is more readily
available and nonmonetary rewards are more likely to motivate be-
available at http://www.commonwealthnorth.org/transcripts/smith03.html).
13 See Vernon Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REv. 465 (2003).
14 Id. at 466.
15 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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havior. Families try to minimize competition among siblings, clubs
look with disfavor on members who compete for personal glory, and
religious organizations use peer pressure to constrain those who do
not labor for the good of the whole.
4. The system of transferable property rights results in a self-
organizing society, what Friedrich Hayek has called a "spontaneous
order." 16 Social cooperation occurs without central direction; the in-
teraction of buyers and sellers leads to coordination across time and
space without the explicit intention of anyone to produce an ordered
society.
5. The economic model of rational actions by individuals can also
be applied to collective choice, especially the actions of government.
The field of Public Choice has yielded numerous insights about the
workings of government, including the divergence between the stated
goals of government action and the actual results.' 7 The importance of
not relying just on good intentions to get good results has been an
obvious implication of this work. Instead, looking at the incentives
decision-makers face and the information generated by various insti-
tutions, has improved our understanding of collective choice and why
many government programs do not deliver what they promise.1
8
6. The principle of comparative advantage means that there are
numerous opportunities for gains from trade. 19 Although this principle
is operative in personal relationships and personal exchange, it is
much more difficult for people to understand the gains from trade
across time and space. Economists have labored long and hard to
convince politicians and the general public that there are gains from
trade with strangers and across borders. They must continue to ex-
plain comparative advantage, the primary driving force in those gains.
7. All of the above contributions of economics to the understand-
ing of impersonal exchange form a framework for understanding an-
other important issue, namely the causes and consequences of eco-
nomic growth. Sometime between 1700 and 1820, a dramatic shift
occurred in the world and certain societies were able to sustain eco-
nomic growth-growth that had an impact on the overall well-being
of almost all of the population.20 Explanations of the working of im-
16 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 35-54 (1973).
17 See, e.g., 1-3 PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY (Charles K. Rowley ed., 1993); Peter J. Hill,
Public Choice: A Review, 34 FAITH AND ECON. 1 (1999).
18 It would be a mistake, however, to see Public Choice as simply explaining why gov-
emnment does not work well. A substantial portion of the field is devoted to finding ways to
improve the institutional environment by altering incentive structures or placing limits on the
use of coercion.
19 Of course, transaction costs can keep such production and trade from occurring.
20 The numbers are overwhelming. In the countries that first experienced growth, the life
[Vol. 56:3
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personal exchange are at the heart of understanding these rising in-
comes and life expectancy, because it is the extension of the world of
impersonal exchange that has been largely responsible for these im-
provements in human well-being.
21
B. Economics as Science
Cast in the above light, Nelson is accurate in describing twentieth-
century economics as having a strong normative element, but his
claim leaves out important parts of the work of economists. He starts
his discussion with the normative assumptions implicit in the work of
Paul Samuelson, but one can also see Samuelson's textbook, Econom-
ics, as an important step in understanding the workings of the world
of impersonal exchanges. Samuelson organized a great deal of think-
ing about this world into a coherent whole that explained how the
economic coordination process works. His analysis was incomplete,
however, in that his failure to apply the tools of economics more gen-
erally to both private and government action led him to be too san-
guine about the possibility of government intervention to correct mar-
ket shortcomings.
The Chicago school, the next target of Nelson, advanced
Samuelson's work with vigorous testing of numerous hypotheses
about human action in the micro and macro spheres. Likewise, the
new institutional economics, another school Nelson discusses, further
extended our understanding of the world of exchange.
The major contribution of the new institutional economists has
been in explaining why certain societies have grown and others have
not. William Easterly has shown that most other theories of growth
are incomplete and efforts to create growth in the less developed parts
of the world have resulted in failure.22 On the other hand, explana-
tions that rely upon the institutional framework are much more pow-
erful than competing theories. Institutions do vary across societies
and the evidence is quite convincing that the rule of law (especially
equality before the law) and enforcement of property rights for a
broad cross-section of the society are of crucial importance in creat-
ing the conditions necessary for economic growth.23
expectancy has risen from approximately thirty-five years to seventy-seven years and per capita
income has increased by about twenty times. ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: A
MILLENIAL PERSPECTIVE 30 tbl.1-5a, 28 tbl.1-2 (2001).
21 North, supra note 5, at 359 (arguing that the wealth of nations grew as a result of more
interdependent and complex institutions).
22 WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH (2001).
23 See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, Institutions as the Funda-
mental Causes of Long Run Growth 11-13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
2006]
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This literature depends heavily upon the concept of transaction
costs, namely the costs of defining, enforcing, and exchanging prop-
erty rights. As Nelson points out, the introduction of transaction costs
has greatly expanded the economic model and has yielded powerful
insights into the reasons for economic growth and the institutional
barriers to such growth.24 The concept of transaction costs, however,
also has forced economists to explicitly acknowledge the importance
of norms and ideology.25 While this has given greater relevance to
economics, it has also reduced its precision somewhat in that its
analysis of trust, the influence of religion, and the importance of cer-
tain basic virtues has not been easy to formalize and test.
C. Responding to the Critics
Social ethicists and theologians have been quick to criticize mod-
em market economies because of the paucity of their moral content.
Economists have an important role to play in responding to many of
these criticisms. One must go back to the distinction between personal
relationships and impersonal exchange, drawn earlier, to understand
how economists can shed light on the debate about the ethics of mar-
kets. Many of the critics believe the more limited role for ethics in
impersonal exchange to be the very root of the problem. For instance,
Adrian Walker argues that markets are ethically flawed because "con-
tractual exchange [is] formally indifferent to the objective good of the
,,26person. Others have argued that the modem liberal economy is
characterized by "homelessness, ' 27 and that an ethical economics
would see economic activity through the lens of gift rather than
through the lens of exchange.28 And Wendell Berry, a frequent critic
of modernity, argues that "[i]f you are dependent on people who do
10,481, 2004) (arguing that differences in economic institutions are a major cause of differences
in economic growth).
24 See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) (discussing how in-
stitutions and legal rights that create transaction costs are key to the success of a capitalist sys-
tem).
25 See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 84-91 (1990) (exploring the relationship between prices and ideological and
behavioral norms).
26 Adrian Walker, The Poverty of Liberal Economics, in WEALTH, POVERTY, AND HUMAN
DESTINY 19, 25-26 (Doug Bandow & David L. Schindler eds., 2003).
27 David Schindler, "Homelessness" and Market Liberalism, in WEALTH, POVERTY, AND
HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 26, at 351 (describing homelessness as the "fundamental problem
of a liberal economy").
28 D. Stephen Long, Catholic Social Teaching and the Global Market, in WEALTH, POV-
ERTY, AND HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 26, at 87 (discussing John Milbank's assertion that
"[t]he Christian life requires a gift economy in which a retum is always expected").
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not know you, who control the value of your necessities, you are not
free, and you are not safe."29
Each of these critiques, however, confuses the two realms of ac-
tion, the personal and the impersonal. It is simply impossible to have
economic production and exchange across time and space (the realm
of impersonal exchange) and also have agreement upon a common
good in that realm.30 The information requirements and the coordina-
tion problems of agreeing on common ends would render the system
inoperable. Also, for someone who focuses on the ethics of personal
relationships, it is hard to accept the importance of competition as a
social good. Again, F.A. Hayek is the most eloquent exponent of dif-
ferentiating between the realms of action:
This application of the same rules of just conduct to the
relations to all other men is rightly regarded as one of the
great achievements of a liberal society. What is usually not
understood is that this extension of the same rules to the rela-
tions to all other men (beyond the most intimate group such
as the family and personal friends) requires an attenuation at
least of some of the rules which are enforced in the relations
to other members of the smaller group.
... Such an order which relies on people working with the ef-
fect of satisfying the wants of people of whom they do not
know presupposes and requires somewhat different moral
views, from one in which people serve visible needs.3'
Economists cannot serve as final arbiters between those who want
society to agree on an objective good and those who believe such an
agreement is not feasible if markets are going to operate. But, as ethi-
cally informed social scientists, they can point out the lesser ethical
requirements of the world of impersonal exchange and the material
benefits of such exchange. And, they can be helpful in making clear
the costs of moving to a world of completely personal exchange, the
world that people like Adrian Walker, David Schindler, and Wendell
Berry seem to favor. Such a move would drastically impoverish mil-
29 WENDELL BERRY, SEX, ECONOMY, FREEDOM, AND COMMUNITY 128 (1993).
30 It is very difficult to determine if these critics of markets would use coercion to enforce
their more rigorous ethics. Most do not explicitly advocate coercive enforcement, but they are
also quite unhappy with the modem liberal order, which limits coercive power to the enforce-
ment of negative rights.
31 2 HAYEK, supra note 16, at 144.
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lions of people, shorten life expectancy, and cause great human suf-
fering. It is in this sense that the task of explaining the world of im-
personal exchange is incumbent on the economics profession.
Economics is also helpful in pointing out some of the counter-
intuitive results of attempting to regulate markets to achieve ends
other than those captured by the self-interest of market participants.
For instance, many governments in the world regulate labor markets
by requiring mandatory payment for certain nonworking days, re-
stricting the flexibility of contracts with regard to time of employment
and enacting minimum wage legislation. A recent World Bank study,
though, finds that more heavily regulated labor markets substantially
limit job creation.32 Higher rates of female unemployment also corre-
late with greater labor market regulation as does a higher degree of
participation in the informal sector.3 3 Almost none of these effects
were those that were predicted or argued for by the advocates of the
labor market regulation. Therefore, economists have much to contrib-
ute to the ongoing discussion of the efficacy of regulation and gov-
ernment intervention in the realm of impersonal exchange.
III. THE LIMITS OF ECONOMICS
A. The Importance of Not Claiming Too Much
I have argued above that an ethically aware economist has impor-
tant contributions to make, both in understanding and articulating the
different norms that are necessary for different arenas of human ac-
tion and in expanding our understanding of the process of impersonal
exchange. This is in response to Nelson's argument that there are
normative assumptions implicit in economic analysis. This, however,
is not the sum total of Nelson's claim that "economics is religion."
When Nelson says that "[e]conomic progress is so important be-
cause progress is seen as the path to the attainment of a new heaven
on earth, to a secular salvation, 34 he is articulating a different argu-
ment. He is moving beyond his first thesis and suggesting that
economists have replaced traditional religious claims about human
flourishing with their own materialistic explanation of what leads to
human happiness.
It is here that Nelson's arguments are the most powerful and the
most troubling. If it is the case, as he argues, that economists have
used the doctrine of efficiency and economic progress to answer the
32 THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004, at 37 (2004).
33 id.
34 NELSON, supra note 2, at 9.
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ultimate questions of meaning and purpose for humans, this is a
strong and damning indictment. I do not read the economists Nelson
cites as making this a part of their explicit argument, but they could
well be implicit coconspirators in the overall secularization of society
and the replacement of claims of the importance of the transcendent
in satisfying basic human longing with their more mundane explana-
tions. Economists ought not to be so taken with their powerful expla-
nations of how the processes of specialization and trade works and
how it produces substantial increases in wealth that they move on to
claim that these increases in wealth answer the ultimate questions of
human dignity and human worth.
Nevertheless, some of the issues that economists deal with do have
strong moral content and their work is helpful in understanding these
moral issues. If one regards poverty as a moral problem, explanations
of how poverty is ameliorated through the wealth creation process are
important contributions to a moral discussion. Likewise, there has
been much concern about the effects of globalization on poor people
in developing economies. This question is largely fueled by ethical
concerns on the part of policy-makers. The economists' answer, that
globalization has generally contributed to the well-being of the poor
in developing economies, is important in dealing with those ethical
issues.
In a similar vein, many government programs are driven by good
intentions, namely a desire to help the marginalized, the oppressed,
and the poor. The thrust of the Public Choice work has shown that
good intentions are not enough and that attention to incentives and
information are crucial for effective functioning of government pro-
grams.
B. Interaction Between the Personal and Impersonal Realms
Nelson's argument that economists have been responsible for the
diminution of traditional norms-norms which may well be crucial
for a functioning society of healthy individuals-raises other issues.
What is the relationship between virtue and the modem economy, or
what is often called modern liberalism? 36 And, are there feedback
loops between the world of impersonal exchange and world of per-
sonal relationships that threaten the stability of the liberal order?
35 THE WORLD BANK, GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY (2002) (assessing the
impact of increased international economic integration); Stanley Fischer, Globalization and Its
Challenges, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (arguing that careful policy choices can counter the
challenges of globalization and help reduce poverty).
36 Modem liberalism usually refers to the economic and political order, a regime of pri-
vate property rights and markets, as well as representative democracy.
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With respect to the first issue, numerous authors throughout his-
tory have argued that the liberal economy requires a set of virtues to
function well. According to Jerry Muller:
The notion that sociopolitical orders require dispositions or
virtues not cultivated by their dominant institutions is at least
as old as Aristotle. In keeping with this tradition of thought,
those who were favorably disposed toward the market em-
phasized the need for counterinstitutions. Time and again,
they asserted or implied that the dispositions, character traits,
virtues, and experiences promoted by the market were insuf-
ficient for human flourishing. Market relations were almost
by definition contractual relations, entered into for self-
interested motives and capable of being dissolved when self-
interest was at an end. But there was more to life-or, more
precisely, they believed there should be more to life-than
contractual relations. That included relations of friendship
and of love, with their accompanying altruism, in which indi-
vidual interest was subordinated to that of others. The family
was the most frequent site of such relations, a point stressed
especially by Hegel, but also important for Smith, Burke, and
others.37
This raises an important issue that is in the background in Nelson's
discussion of the promise of economics to create "a new heaven on
earth."38 What does the expansion of the world of impersonal ex-
change do to the moral base of society? As economic growth occurs,
and as economists explain, and at least implicitly justify it, is there
danger that the world of impersonal exchange will destroy the world
of personal relationships, the world where much personal fulfillment
is found and where certain virtues are nurtured? Recall that Hayek
described the danger of the extension of market ethics into inappro-
priate realms. "Yet if we were always to apply the rules of the ex-
tended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them."39
37 JERRY Z. MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN MODERN EUROPEAN
THOUGHT 393 (2002) (citation omitted); see also PETER BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION
(1986) (arguing that although capitalism is usually seen as a conservative force, it has radically
changed social, political, and cultural relations); PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1999) (analyzing the views of the major figures of modem liberal-
ism); MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (1982) (exploring the social
and moral underpinnings of capitalism); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 249-81
(1999) (examining the role of values and reason in furthering freedom and encouraging devel-
opment).
38 NELSON, supra note 2, at 9.
39 HAYEK, supra note 10, at 17.
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This is an important issue, and one of which most economists are,
unfortunately, unaware. In their explanation of the world of imper-
sonal exchange and the limited ethics required for that realm, they can
be guilty of attempting to extend the world of contract and price to all
human relationships. But there is much in the world of personal rela-
tionships that does not fit the contractual mold. Jennifer Roback
Morse describes some of those relationships:
To describe the relationship between parents and children as a
contract, even an implicit contract, is to do violence to the re-
ality of both childhood and parenthood; to describe the rela-
tionship between an adult child and an aging parent as a con-
tract, or even a partnership, totally misses the point.4°
Numerous philosophers and ethicists throughout the ages have ar-
gued that the family and other close personal affiliations are crucial
for the development of the necessary virtues for the functioning of the
market order. If this is the case, economists ought to be aware of the
possibility that this market order, inappropriately applied, may eat
away at the heart of markets. Since economists are not trained to ana-
lyze the virtue producing aspects of personal relationships, it is doubt-
ful that they can do much more than acknowledge this possibility. But
it is important that there be at least an acknowledgement; otherwise,
"economics as religion" can correctly be identified as a false religion.
Thus, economists should be cognizant of the necessity of a func-
tioning moral framework for both the personal and impersonal realms
of action and should acknowledge that the work of economics is in-
sufficient to answer all moral questions. More humility on the part of
economists in terms of the work that they do and the answers they
provide would be helpful in this regard.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nelson's work is an important contribution to understanding mod-
em economics. He is correct in identifying the normative assumptions
behind much economic work, but this does not mean that economics
is simply an expression of personal preferences for particular norms.
Rather, economists should acknowledge that any discussion of the
social coordination process is based upon a particular rights frame-
work, and they should be willing to recognize that there is an ethical
foundation for such a rights framework.
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Economists do, however, have an important contribution to make
to the debate about how economies function and what are appropriate
policies. They can explicate the different degrees of agreement on the
norms that are necessary for the world of personal exchange and the
world of impersonal exchange. And they can perform an important
social service by helping people understand how the world of imper-
sonal exchange works. This entails explaining the importance of in-
centives and information that are generated by prices and property
rights, and also explaining how this coordination system has in-
creased overall wealth in the last two-hundred years. But they should
not claim too much for their analysis and should be aware of the rela-
tionship between the world of impersonal exchange that they describe
and the rest of human interaction. They should especially avoid
claiming that economics offers answers to the ultimate questions of
meaning and purpose that people have struggled with throughout his-
tory.
